THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

as court of review

Number Pfv.E.21813/2005/2.

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary, in the case of the self-represented plaintiff Dr György Ádám (1107 Budapest, Somfa köz 10.), who filed for retrial, against Loránt Hegedűs Jr, represented by the barrister Dr Géza Gulyás (1022 Budapest, Bimbó u. 3. mfszt. 5.) launched at the Pest Central District Court under number 22.P.89.634/2004., based on a consideration of a request of review filed by the plaintiff against the Budapest City Court ruling of 20^th April, 2005, number 47.Pf.23.421/2005/3. issued the following

r u l i n g :

The Supreme Court rejects the plaintiff's request of review.

There is no appeal against this ruling.

J u s t i f i c a t i o n :

The original court rejected the request of review filed by the plaintiff as one unsuitable for a hearing of merit.

The court of appeal ruling upheld the ruling issued by the original court.

The plaintiff filed a request of review against the binding ruling, and requested that the ruling be nullified, citing a breach of law.

Under paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law a request of review may be filed against a binding ruling to the Supreme Court by the party, the interferer and those – with regard to parts of the ruling applicable to them – who are affected by an order of the ruling.

Of binding rulings issued in civilian cases only a binding verdict (partial, supplementary and intermediary verdicts) may be attacked by a request of review, as a court always delivers a verdict in the merits of the case (paragraph (1) of section 212 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law). Therefore the binding ruling delivered in the merits of the case as cited in paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law can only be a ruling issued in a non-trial procedure.

The ruling issued in the trial procedure attacked by the plaintiff filing for retrial cannot be regarded as a binding ruling delivered in the merits of the case, against which there is recourse to a request of review.

Therefore the Supreme Court has rejected the plaintiff filing for retrial under paragraph (1) of section 273 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law.

No. Pfv.E.21813/2005/2.

Given that the Supreme Court rejected the request of review on a technical point it did not have to rule in the matter of legal costs (point a) of paragraph (1) of section 57 of the 93^rd Act of 1990).

The Court of Constitution nullified the first sentence of paragraph (5) of section 273 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law with its ruling 42/2004. (XI.9.), thus abolishing the stipulation that there is no appeal against the rulings issued by the judge. The Civil Code, however, contains no stipulations which could form a basis for an appeal against a ruling issued by the Supreme Court in a preliminary consideration of a request of review. Therefore the Supreme Court – on the basis of subsection B of section 275 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law, and paragraph (2) of section 222 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law, and paragraph (3) of section 220 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law – informs the party requesting the review that there is no appeal against the current ruling.

3^rd October, 2005 Budapest

Dr Judit Demeter, by her own hand.

Judge

To certify: Ms V

secretary
To the Civilian College of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary.

Ref. no.: Pfv.E.21.813/2005/2.

I, the plaintiff Dr György Ádám, in my civilian lawsuit filed against Loránt Hegedűs Jr, received on 14^th October, 2005 the Supreme Court's "ruling" issued on behalf of the Supreme Court as court of review by Judge Dr Judit Demeter on 3^rd October, 2005. The "ruling" is in breach of the law, it is unacceptable in an independent democratic state of law and must therefore be overturned.

For all these reasons I present the Civilian College of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary with the following

s u b m i s s i o n :

I request that the ruling issued by a single Judge, reference number as above, be nullified and that the Supreme Court hear the MERITS of the lawsuit!

J u s t i f i c a t i o n :

I.

Under paragraph (1) of section 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary: "The Republic of Hungary recognises the unbreachable and inalienable rights of man, to honour and protect these is the state's primary obligation".

This passage of the Constitution was disregarded by nine Judges out of ten – when issuing rulings in the course of the above lawsuit – in the judiciary system of the Republic of Hungary: my unbreachable and inalienable right was not honoured or protected.

My lawsuit's essential purpose was to seek the "protection" (and therefore honouring) of my fundamental – and thus unbreachable and inalienable – rights by the Hungarian judiciary.

In my lawsuit and its supplements, furthermore in my subsequent submissions I PROVED (!) how the defendant's plea to the "Christian Hungarian State!" breached my fundamental rights, which the Hungarian State – like every independent democratic state of law – must honour and protect.

The defendant's "plea" claims that Jews (prehistoric man come alive) – who came to Hungary to kick the Hungarians once more – must be excluded. The exclusion of Jews – as a commonly known expression – is a hateful incitement used by anti-Semites and known for a hundred years, which stands for murder or deportation to a desert island (etc.).

This claim can be proven with a single example: In 1933 in the Netherlands an anti-Semite – by name Egon van Winghene – wrote a book in German, entitled "Where Do We Put the Jews?". The book was translated into Hungarian by István Szabó in 1935. The following can be read on page 65 of the work: "Now what does experience teach us? We are not helped by exclusion, or by national assimilation, or by sporadic numerus clausus, or by the ghetto, or by minority rights and above all not by two-faced pseudo-Zionism! To solve the Jewish question in a single Aryan nation, that is in a geographically restricted area – as it is the ambition of most nationalists – is similarly impossible.

There are only two ways radically to solve the Jewish question:

1) The bodily destruction and extermination of the alien nation, identified as dangerous. This is hardly a viable way forward for the struggle. I have suggested that the pan-Aryan attitude rejects this possibility. Why, if we were to exterminate all Jews in Switzerland or in Romania, to the last man, we would not bring the question any closer to a solution. Brothers of Guggenheims and Cohens in Prague and Warsaw, the relatives of Fruchtermanns and Menasches in Odessa and Budapest, and especially the Pollacks and Rotths in Vienna and Berlin will ensure the necessary replacements and spawn. Partial pogroms only make martyrs. The extermination of a 27 million-strong nation, which lives dispersed in so many countries, is furthermore technically impossible.

2.) One hundred per cent complete exclusion. This is the only possible way, however hard it may be. Only the complete, one hundred per cent Zionism can help us. Such Zionism must be openly adopted at last by us Aryans. Let us get this clear, perfect Zionism, that is the full exclusion of Jews, as the most dangerous enemy of our culture, and the forced relocation of Jews and those of Jewish origin in a country to be established for them – and a concurrent abolition of all their rights in all Aryan countries.

Jews will not let us in peace, until we tolerate them in our midst, we must ensure that they are physically and technically not in a position to implant in us their destructive, putrefying spirit via assimilation and emancipation.

Even the ghetto – this reasonable and laudable protective system of sober mediaeval times – is a blunted sword, which created a fudged situation. Thus one day, through cunning and deception the walls "unjustly opposed to the religious equality of Jews" were destroyed and it was allowed that the enclosed wolves freely attack the flock of innocents suspecting no evil (see the accursed French revolution, the decrees of Casmir the Great, Cromwell and Napoleon). (page 65.)

The books was published in a reprint version in 2002 by the "Gede Testvérek Bt" in Hungary, it is available in thousands of copies to be purchased in countless book shops.

The above quote can clarify it to everyone – if they do not yet know – what the EXCLUSION of Jews means (a radical solution to the Jewish problem, point two).

The “proposal” of the “exclusion” of Jews, as set down in the defendant’s writing, is a precisely defined notion, namely: the most despicable mass murder, or deportation to death camps known in the history of humankind. The defendant is a “Christian priest” whose incitements have been seriously considered by the Hungarian State for a thousand years. This inspired amongst others the Jewish laws of 1938-1944, which is my greatest family tragedy. This is why I filed the lawsuit!

The Hungarian State does not consider equally the “Christian priest’s” repeated calls to “exclusion” (murder or deportation) and my request of the Hungarian State to provide protection (paragraph (1) of section 8 of the Constitution). I, in spite of all this, did not ask anything else of the Hungarian judiciary, but that it establishes that the defendant breached my personal rights (point a.) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code) and to ban him from repeating the offence (point b.)).

The Hungarian State REFUSES EVEN TO do so much to protect my constitutional rights against the “Christian Hungarian priest”, while the proportion of the defendant’s incitement to exclusion is a million times graver than my most modest request of the Hungarian State’s judiciary.

Let me note that the above are not “new pieces of evidence” but another aspect of the statement so often proven by me, because my statements set down in the lawsuit were rejected by the Court of Appeals ruling and a series of other – gravely illegal – rulings citing new and again new “arguments”. I – bound by the obligation to provide evidence – must bring new arguments against the increasingly illogical, yet persistent “justifications” for the rejection of my lawsuit.

Under the Constitution the judiciary of the Hungarian State should have considered the following stipulations when delivering its verdict:

– – Constitution, paragraph (1) of section 55. “In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to …personal safety”

– – Constitution paragraph (1) section 57. “In the Republic of Hungary all are equal before the court...” furthermore paragraph (5): “As set down in law, in the Republic of Hungary everyone has legal recourse against a court decision, which is in breach of their rights.”

– – According to paragraph (1) of section 61 of the Constitution: “In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to freedom of expression of opinion...” The obvious limitation of this freedom is determined by paragraph (1) of section 54 of the Constitution, which states: “In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right, from birth... to human dignity, which cannot be stripped arbitrarily from anyone.” In the course of the trial I have repeatedly proven that in the “manifesto” of the defendant, by way of incitement to exclusion and other slanderous allegations he has repeatedly breached my right to human dignity, and cannot invoke his right set down in paragraph (1) of section 61 of the Constitution with reference to his manifesto addressed to the “Christian Hungarian State!”. With reference to this writing, inciting to exclusion (etc.) – if the person whose personal rights were breached files a lawsuit – the Hungarian judiciary must establish a breach of the law.

My note to the above: under paragraph (1) of section 57 of the Constitution, “in keeping with the stipulations of the law” a serious injury was inflicted by the Supreme Court allowing a case of such weight to be ... seemingly!... finally rejected by a single Judge, in the form of a ruling (without justification).

When evaluating the case paragraph (2) of section 8 of the Constitution must be considered, which states that “the essential contents of fundamental rights... cannot even be altered by law.”

On the basis of all these the ref. no. Pfv.E.21.813/2005/2. of the single Judge of the Supreme Court is – de jure – void.

II.

While I proved in part I of my justification that the “ruling” issued by the Supreme Court on 3^rd October, 2005, is void, for the sake of precision I shall analyse how the ruling is gravely illegal in terms of trial law, in other words why it is void.

In the final paragraph of its first page the ruling quotes paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law: “Under paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law a request of review may be filed against a binding ruling to the Supreme Court by the party, the interferer and those – with regard to parts of the ruling applicable to them – who are affected by an order of the ruling.”

The text of the law includes expressis verbis the legal situation of “binding ruling” as matter of fact.

Subsequently the first and second paragraphs of page two of the ruling says: “Of binding rulings issued in civilian cases only a binding verdict (partial, supplementary and intermediary verdicts) may be attacked by a request of review, as a court always delivers a verdict in the merits of the case (paragraph (1) of section 212 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law). Therefore the binding ruling delivered in the merits of the case as cited in paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law can only be a ruling issued in a non-trial procedure”

This assertion of the ruling is a serious legal error. According to paragraph (1) of section 212 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law: “The court will decide the merits of a case with a verdict, in every other matter arising in the course of the lawsuit – including the termination of the lawsuit – decisions will take the form of rulings.”

The “including” term was interpreted by the Judge sophistically. The legislator understood the term to mean that the ruling terminating the lawsuit – while a decision of MERIT (this cannot be interpreted in any other way) – takes the form of a ruling, but against this – because it is a ruling of merit – there is no legal recourse. Nowhere does the Code of Civilian Trial Law say that a ruling terminating a lawsuit – because it is a ruling and not a verdict – cannot be a decision of merit.

The term “érdemi” (translated as “of merit”) is, according to the Hungarian dictionary (Akadémiai Kiadó Vol II., 1960. p. 412.): “Regarding the merit, essence of something, meritorious, essential. Hearing of merits (law)”. This is how the “of merit” expression is to be understood according to the dictionary of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The ruling declaring the termination of the lawsuit therefore can only be a ruling “of merit”.

The term “including” serves the very purpose of differentiating from rulings other than those of merits, thus precisely that the “ruling” - contrarily – is of merit “therefore” (a term used by the Judge issuing the ruling) a legally binding ruling issued in the merits of a case, against which there is legal recourse!

On the basis of all this I request that the Civilian College of the Supreme Court to hold a hearing to decide the merits of the request of review, as set down in paragraph (2) of section 274 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law – because the rejection of the request of review is illegal with regard to a hearing of the merits of the case. I request that the Pfv. IV council of the Supreme Court is excluded from the handling of the case, as set down in point e.) of paragraph (1) of section 13 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law, as Dr Mátyás Mészáros and Dr Judit Demeter (the two Judges acting in the matter) have already taken decisions in the case, and their objective consideration of the case cannot be expected.

III.

In my lawsuit I emphatically stressed that I do not regard myself as either of Jewish origins or of the Israelite faith, I have been a materialist all my life. This, however, never interested anyone, I have always been regarded as a Jew, which is why I was affected by the numerus clausus, forced labour, deportation to death camps, the murder of my younger brothers, and since then – unrelenting in the third millennium – the “Jew-baiting” directed against me.

I won the trial on 1^st July, 2003 – at the original court – with the excellent, expert verdict 20.P.85.346/2003/10 of Dr György Mohay of the Pest Central District Court. Never since then has anyone written down what – so to speak – was wrong with the excellent, just verdict. Therefore I hold this verdict to be the only meritorious – and in this respect – binding verdict in the case.

– – As a result of an appeal by the defendant the trial went to the Budapest City Court as Court of Appeal, where the late chairwoman Dr Mrs Andrásné Felkai, Judge Dr Tibor Tóth and Judge Dr Laura Salamon ruled on (or against) my lawsuit. The contents were never considered, they cited Ruling 13 of the Civilian College of the Supreme Court illegally and asked four questions in the verdict (of who I know not), thus they rejected my lawsuit for purely formal reasons on 26^th February, 2004 under number F.B. 52. Pf. 29.063/2003/4.

– I then filed a request of review, with a detailed argument showing the grave breaches of the law by the court of appeals, and I asked for a verdict in the merits (!) of the case. My request was rejected by the Supreme Court's single judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros under number Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2 on 25^th May, 2004, arguing that under an amendment of the Code of Civilian Trial Law, which came into force on 1^st January, 2002 (105^th Act of 2001) a request of review may be filed if the ruling to be reviewed is in breach of law with regard to the consideration of the MERITS of the case, and if the ruling was in conflict with the Supreme Court's general legal rulings… The ruling rejected my request of review for two reasons

– – under sections 75-85 of the Civil Code my DIRECT (!) involvement could not be established (this is, by the way, not required by sections 75-85 of the Civil Code)

– – according to a theoretical ruling published under number 2002/2/740 of the official anthology of Supreme Court rulings the protection of personal rights may only be availed of if an act can be established as being in connection with a specific person. The theoretical decision 2002/2/740 of the Civilian College deals with the rejection of a plaintiff where a person complained that his surname was the same as the name of a toilet paper manufactured by the defendant. This reasoning, which claims that I cannot go to trial about the tragedy of my life – although the defendant has called from my exclusion – because another plaintiff felt hurt by sharing a name with a brand of toilet paper. This injures me to such an extent that I requested the chairman of the Supreme Court to initiate a disciplinary hearing against Mátyás Mészáros, which request the chairman of the Supreme Court indirectly refused. The ruling cited another verdict, it claimed that the L.B.Pfv. IV.20.299/2004/2. verdict established the same thing. But this verdict was not published in the official anthology of the Supreme Court's rulings, therefore this citation too, is seriously in breach of the law.

– After all this I submitted a request of retrial to the Pest Central District Court, which rejected on 9^th December 2004 in ruling 22.P.89.634/2004/4. by Dr Attila Gáspár. The illegal ruling claims that some of my submissions were not new, while some submissions could have been presented in the original trial, and the issue of whether there is legal recourse is a question of law, therefore cannot form the basis of a retrial.

The reasons were legal and factual errors, which I discussed in detail in my appeal against the ruling.

What is put forward then by the ruling rejecting retrial at the original court?

a.) a.) the facts presented by me are not new

b.) b.) I could have cited the new facts in the original trial

c.) c.) the lack of legal recourse is a question of law and not of fact. A question of law cannot form a basis for a retrial.

My opinion of all this:

ad a.) Indeed, some of the facts presented in the request of retrial were “not new” in a very narrow interpretation of the expression, but they were so twisted, misinterpreted or confused by the judge acting in the court of appeals in his verdict FB.52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. to such an extent that in my request of review and my request of retrial I had to correct them, reinterpret some of my statements, therefore IN THIS RESPECT they were new, which I could not present in the “original proceedings” – being unaware of future distortions – but made abundantly clear in the trial documentation. The number of questions of fact and law a court can raise is infinite. Thus the judge rejecting my request of retrial wants me to submit an INFINITE number of questions of fact and law in the original trial??? Nothing can be added to this impossible claim. This is thus no reason to reject my request of retrial. This is the judge's extreme bias – against me.

ad b.) Indeed I could have cited the “new facts” in the original proceedings as well, had I been a fortune teller and a mind reader. Unfortunately I am neither, but my lawsuit should not have been rejected. The reason: If I had known in advance that the different courts (for example the Pf.52.F.B.) will ask impossible things, and cite the Civilian College of the Supreme Court's ruling 13, and that I am not DIRECTLY recognisable from the writing, I could have indeed presented all these facts earlier... if I expected these absurd and impossible reasons – which were cited to reject my lawsuit – to be brought up by the courts. The serious errors and breaches of law by the courts are reversed in the ruling by judge, and attributed to me as my “errors”. It is, however, indubitable that the analogy of paragraph (4) of section 4 of the Civil Code is applicable here: a judge delivering a verdict can never cite a cause attributable to him or her as justification of a verdict.

ad.c.) The question of “legal recourse” - simply in itself – can be a question of fact, or equally a question of law. It all depends whether the existence or lack of “legal recourse” is based on what elements (facts or law). In the current case – according to the judge – I have no legal recourse, because on the basis of the defendant's writing one cannot directly refer to me the incitement to hateful exclusion. It is, however – as I proved – a QUESTION OF FACT whether I TOO (!) am personally recognisable from the writing! Seventeen witnesses put it in writing that they recognised me. The “legal recourse” in this dispute is a question of fact, not of law, therefore can form the basis of a retrial!

Furthermore, I state that in my appeal against the court of appeals verdict, and my four submissions I discussed how one deduces, moving from the general to the individual, using deductive syllogism, which was NOT CONSIDERED BY ANY JUDGE, they did not even refer to it, when it was the decisive piece of evidence proving that I HAVE LEGAL RECOURSE. (By the way: this manoeuvre of logic can be performed by a six-year old, they just don't know what it is called, while the court consistently – but seriously illegally – ignored it.) Moreover, my lawsuit conformed to every stipulation of sections 121-123 of Chapter VI of the Code of Civilian Trial Law, and the Court, under paragraph (2) of section 3 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law the court is bound to the lawsuit, therefore if the lawsuit is in compliance with the necessary requirements, the court is bound to take it as a basis: the rules of logic are included!

This is none other than the reversal of the burden of proof, therefore not a verdict delivered by an independent, democratic state of law, but the procedure of an Inquisition in the third millennium in the civilised world.

– I filed an appeal against the rejection by ruling of my request of retrial. The Court of Appeal delivered the F.B.47.Pfv.23.421/2005/3. verdict WITHOUT HEARING on 20^th April, 2005, with chairwoman Dr Mrs Tibor Kosztyu, Dr Judit Viola and Dr Mrs Béla Gál.

The court of appeals procedure against retrial of my lawsuit – a ruling based entirely in formal matters of trial law – was fatally illegal.

– – The Court of Appeals in the retrial request claims in paragraph 3 of page 2 that the “protection of rights is limited to the person who is UNEQUIVOCALLY identified.” I, applying the rules of logic PROVED that logically, using deductive syllogism (by deducing from the general to the specific) my person can be unequivocally “identified”. As I was excluded from the hearing, I could not cite the unequivocal rules of logic, but the F.B. 47.Pfv. council ignored it entirely in their justification.

– – Again the “justification” included the Civilian College of the Supreme Court's ruling 13, which – because it refers exclusively to corrections in the press – cannot be applied in my lawsuit, but I proved that even under an illegally applied ruling 13 my “person can in other ways” be recognised. The appeals decision by the Budapest City Court ignored this too, in its illegal procedure.

– – The ruling ignored entirely that I brought seventeen witnesses to prove: they recognised my person from the writing of the defendant. This entirely evident item of evidence was excluded from the admissible pieces of evidence with a wholly illogical justification on the first page, in the fourth paragraph from the bottom... I remain ignorant of why, the “justification” is completely confused.

– – The F.B.47.Pfv. Court, in the justification of its ruling of rejection, again included such elements in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, which are not included in any law (the whole second page dealt with this). The ruling inserts that the writing must refer to a person INDIVIDUALLY and DIRECT involvement must apply, and SPECIFICALLY!

– – The F.B. 47.Pfv. council then states that “the article, which forms the basis of the complaint, did not name the plaintiff, his person was not INDIVIDUALLY referred to, the piece includes such generalisation, which rendered the person of the plaintiff unrecognisable.” It is impossible to understand how 17 witnesses still arrived at recognising me?

– – To conclude, the F.B.47.Pfv. council states the following in the ruling: “The Court of Appeals feels the arguments cited by the plaintiff at best prove that others in general believe him to be of a social group or community of which the writing, which forms basis of the complaint, is about, this however does not mean that at the same time the indispensable condition was met, that the direct involvement, or personal identifiability of the plaintiff entered the awareness of others, and that this was expressed, as such an assertion that he was personally recognisable as a member of the group or community, could not be made.” This part of the justification is a classic example of a logical self-contradiction. If the “argument cited” (the written statement of seventeen witnesses) serves to prove that others, in general believe him to be belonging to that group (?), of which the writing, which forms basis of the complaint, is about, this however does not mean that at the same time the INDISPENSABLE (?) condition was ALSO (?) met that the defendant's

INDIVIDUAL

DIRECT involvement

PERSONAL IDENTIFIABILITY ENTERED THE AWARENESS of others AS WELL... !

My questions:

– – If such an assertion could be made, why did seventeen people do so? This means that such an assertion could be made!

– – What legal situations are those that were included in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code (individual, direct involvement), where does the Civil Code prescribe these?

On the basis of all these the ruling issued by the F.B. 47.Pfv. council is illegal to such an extent that it no longer constitutes a ruling in an independent democratic state of law.

– – I have submitted a request of review against the gravely illegal ruling of the F.B. Pfv. 47. council, which ignores the elementary rules of logics (eg. deductive syllogism), which was rejected in ruling Pfv.E.21.813/2005/2 by a single judge. I have analysed this in detail in part I of my present submission, and proved that it was illogical and illegal. It is not necessary to repeat that analysis.

IV.

So far ten judged have participated in my trial, issuing rulings. These are in order:

Rulings:

1.) 1.) Dr György Mohay verdict PKKB.20.P.85.346/2003/10. on 1^st July, 2003.

2.) 2.) Dr Mrs András Felkai, chairwoman, Dr Tibor Tóth, Dr Laura Salamon verdict

F.B, as court of appeal 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. 26^th February 2004.

3.) Dr Mátyás Mészáros ruling L.B.Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2. 25^th May, 2004.

4.) Dr Attila Gáspár ruling PKKB. 22.P.89.634/2004/4. 9^th December, 2004.

5.) Dr Mrs Tibor Kosztyu chairwoman, Dr Judit Vida, Dr Mrs Béla Gál verdict 47.Pfv.23.421/2005/3. 20^th April, 2005.

6.) Dr Judit Demeter ruling L.B.Pfv.E. 21.813/2005/2. 3^rd October 2005.

3.)

It must be noted here that a criminal trial was also ongoing against Loránt Hegedűs Jr. The original court, chaired by criminal justice Dr László Szebeni and two co-chairs handed down a sentence of a year and six months in prison, suspended for three years probation on 6^th December 2002, with the 13.B.423/2002/7. verdict. At the Budapest Criminal Court he was acquitted with verdict 3.Bf.111/2003/10. An argument amongst others was that “the defendant stated” Exclude the Jews, for if you don't, they will exclude you. This statement assumes a mutual relationship. However, Jews are not aggressive, but a peaceful, tame people, the mutual relationship is not fulfilled, the defendant thus does not desire their exclusion. This means that if the Jews were aggressive, the defendant would be guilty. It was after this that his faithful carried him with roars of triumph from the Supreme Court's Markó utca building. This is how the Hungarian judiciary rules in this day and age.

Of the ten judges – delivering a ruling in the trial – only one, Dr György Mohay issued a verdict on the merits of the trial. His verdict was an excellent, scientific reasoning, faultless in terms of both law and logics.

The other nine judges cited illogical trial law – thus formal - “arguments” to reject my lawsuit, thus never addressed the merits of my lawsuit: they followed the defendant's writing's plea, making their own the legal continuance of a thousand years of Hungarian Statehood. Thus existentially “complying” with the Supreme Court chairman's feelings on the Hungarianness reaching to the very roots of Christianity (see my writing in the legal documentation: “Sacral “sins,” material punishments”).

Let me note that the judges delivering rulings in the case had an extraordinarily easy task when rejecting the lawsuit. They did not have to engage in an actual debate of legal facts, knowing that the last word, like it or not, rests with them. The party presenting their arguments in a legal dispute is in a contrary position, because what legal arguments are accepted are up to the judge, when considering the merits and delivering a ruling based in their convictions. The “conviction” of the mentioned nine judges was obviously that their personal existence was primary, and the opinion of the disputing party could be “waved aside” with a formal ruling... they acted accordingly.

According to this attitude, what the “Christian Hungarian priest” says is obligatory for the faithful, like the “holy writ”. Namely that the Jews:

– – are prehistoric man made flesh

– – have lost Zion for their crimes against God,

– – have come to the shores of the Danube to kicks once more into the Hungarians,

– – EXCLUDE THEM!

Nine Hungarian judges did not accept this as the breach of personal rights. This is yet another humiliation I suffer at the hands of the “Christian Hungarian State!” – this time at the hands of the third branch of government, the judiciary. It cannot be compared to the degradations I suffered between 1938 and May 1945, but indubitably a continuation of it. I filed my lawsuit because – although the fact that my personal rights were breached by the defendant and his writings had been affirmed by thousands – I felt it necessary that a reputable institution in Hungary – the Court – also affirmed this. The Hungarian Court has failed to affirm it in a binding verdict, but it did prove that it is not a reputable institution. I have put all this in writing and uploaded to the internet (including the present submission) in Hungarian and English language versions (www.jog-vita.hu.). The trial – thus – is followed throughout the civilised world: the USA, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Israel (Yad Wasem), etc. and I have already received feedback.

To the Civilian College of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary!

I request that on the basis of the merits of my present submission my request for retrial be considered in a hearing of its merits, with the exclusion of the Pfv. IV council.

Budapest, 10^th November, 2005.

Dr György Ádám

plaintiff, barrister